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Abstract 
Since 1999, the scallop fisheries have been granted access to closed areas on Georges Bank, and the 
access programs have been managed through individual vessel quotas for scallops, and a common-pool 
total allowable catch (TAC) for yellowtail flounder bycatch.  The scallop resource is neither overfished 
and nor is overfishing occurring, but the yellowtail flounder resource is both overfished and experiencing 
overfishing according to criteria of U.S. fishery regulations.  The yellowtail flounder bycatch TAC has 
forced early closure of these fisheries in more than half of these access fisheries. 
 
We present two programs designed in cooperation with fishermen and permit holders to avoid yellowtail 
flounder bycatch in these access fisheries, one in Closed Area II (CAII) in 2009 and the other in the 
Nantucket Lightship Area (NLA) in 2010.  For both programs, we mapped the areas of scallop and 
yellowtail flounder densities and sent the density maps to permit owners and captains.  In the second 
program, we implemented a daily system of captains transmitting daily yellowtail flounder catch and 
number of tows by area, analyzing the data, and sending messages to captains indicating low, medium, 
and high scallop densities per pound of yellowtail flounder by area.  The 2009 CAII fishery closed three 
weeks after opening yielding only 61% of the scallop TAC.  About 1/3 of vessels participated in the 2010 
NLA voluntary reporting program.  Observer data indicates that the scallop TAC will be caught for the 
first time in any closed area access fishery for the first time in the 2010 NLA fishery. 
 
Introduction 
Most fishery economic models are based on the assumption of competition driven by a motive for profit 
that allows only market interactions between fishermen.  This assumption leads to models that rule out 
non-market  voluntary  cooperation  for  the  common  good  and  conclude  that  free  riders  provide  the 
sufficient condition for sub-optimal yield in common pool fisheries .
1  In public good models based on 
individual profit motivation, the optimal strategy for all participants is to withhold contribution to the 
public good.
2 
 
Fishery management strategies have used command and control regulations, legally enforceable rights, or 
a  combination  of  the  two  in  attempts  to  overcome  perverse  incentives  and  achieve  optimal  yield.  
Individual  Transferable  Quotas  and  other  management  actions  have  prevented  fishery  collapse  by 
reducing catch rates below the fishing mortality rates associated with competitive equilibrium fishing 
effort in several countries.
3  
 
Informal groups or clubs with voluntary memberships may also create institutions and regulations that 
mitigate perverse incentives to achieve common goals.
4  Wilson presents theories for club formation 
based on search for fish and defense against harmful actions by competitors.
  5  Wilson concludes that 
cooperative behavior in pursuing group goals rather than individual goals depends upon distribution of 
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social  characteristics.    Ostrom  argues  that  social  norms  based  on  reciprocity,  trust,  and  fairness  can 
mitigate loss of social goals through individual incentives.
6  Ostrom also presents design principles for 
successful programs for cooperation to achieve group goals. 
 
Voluntary bycatch avoidance programs in fisheries limited by common pool TACs for bycatch offer 
opportunities  for  cooperative  behavior  to  avoid  closures  that  limit  catch  of  target  fisheries.    Fleet 
communications programs that share information on location of bycatch among vessels may increase the 
total yield of target species that is caught by the fleet
7.  Results, however, have been mixed.  Abbott and 
Wilen compare the failure of a bycatch avoidance using fleet communications program in a Bering Sea 
fishery with the success of a similar program “for the same fleet over the same period” (ital. in original) 
in the Bering Sea.
8  The authors speculate that the failure of cooperative measures was caused by resource 
conditions that were not suited to fleet communications programs: large area fished, long fishery season, 
random and unpredictable location of bycatch species, and low benefits from cooperation.  
 
This paper presents a description of two successive programs for voluntary avoidance of bycatch in the 
U.S. Atlantic Sea scallop fishery based on Wilson’s theories and Ostrom’s prescriptions for successful 
cooperative behavior.  We also present some preliminary results from these programs.  The paper is 
composed of sections describing the sea scallop fishery, the rotational fishery management system, and 
voluntary bycatch avoidance programs for the 2009 Closed Area II and the 2010 Nantucket Lightship 
Area access scallop fisheries.  The paper concludes with some observations on the success of the process 
used in designing and operating the program for voluntary bycatch avoidance. 
 
U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery and Management  
The Atlantic Sea Scallop (Placopecten magellanicus) fishery, extending from Maine to North Carolina, is 
one of the most valuable fisheries in the U.S., averaging almost US$400 million per year in dockside 
value from 2004 through 2008.  The scallop fishery developed rapidly in the late 1940s and early 1950s in 
New England, especially New Bedford, MA and then declined in the 1960s and early 1970s (Figure 1) at 
least partially due to Canadian-registered vessels that had moved closer to New England reducing the 
catch per unit effort in those areas and capturing some of the U.S. market by reducing exvessel prices to 
U.S.-registered scallop vessels
9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Landings of Atlantic Sea Scallops by Year. Source: NMFS. 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The Fishery Management and Conservation Act in 1976, now known as the Magnuson Stevens Act (Act), 
reserved an Exclusive Economic Zone for U.S. vessels, forcing Canadian-registered vessels off the now-
U.S.  portion  of  Georges  Bank.    U.S.-registered  scallop  vessels  filled  the  niche  left  by  the  departed 
Canadian registered vessels. The Act also encouraged growth of the U.S. scallop fishery by subsidizing 
the construction of new vessels.   
 
In 1982, the Scallop Fishery Management Plan required by the Act set a maximum average scallop meats 
per pound per trip.  The meat count regulations failed to fulfill conservation goals even with after the 
maximum meat count was reduced to reduce the catch of young scallops.  Vessel owners and captains 
also  strongly  disapproved  of  the  regulation  due  to  disputes  over  dockside  enforcement  methods  of 
sampling and estimating meat counts.  In 1994, meat count regulations were replaced by limited access 
permits for offshore scallop vessels and regulations limiting crew size and days fished per year.  Full-time 
limited access permitted vessels were limited to 120 days at sea per year (DAS).   
 
Later in 1994, The U.S. Secretary of Commerce took Emergency Action to close large areas of Georges 
Bank and areas to the south to rebuild depleted stocks of cod, haddock, and flounders. (Figure 2) These 
areas  were  approximately  the  same  areas  that  had  been  closed  during  spawning  season  for  various 
groundfish species since 1970.  The Emergency Action, made permanent shortly thereafter, closed these 
areas year round to all mobile gear, including scallop dredges. Three more areas further south were closed 
year round to scallop dredges in order to protect young scallops.  Together these six areas contained 85% 
of the harvestable biomass
10. 
 
Scallops, which move little after reaching maturity, grew quickly in the closed areas of Georges Bank and 
by 1999 scallop density was 10 times greater in the closed areas than in open areas.  These abundant 
stocks tempted fishermen, who were tightly constrained by low biomass in the open areas, to enter the 
closed areas, which increased encounters with enforcement agencies in the U.S. and Canada.   
 
The period of low scallop landings in the mid-to-late 1990s, due to low biomass in the open areas, and 
sharp reductions in DAS to meet the new stock reference points in the Sustainable Fisheries Act forced 
most vessels below the break-even point
11.  Proposals to allow transfer of DAS between vessels in order 
to reduce costs split the permit holders into two organizations, one lobbying for transfer of DAS and the 
other opposed to transfer and consolidation of DAS quotas.  The inaccessible high biomass in the closed 
areas offered support for a wider strategy of opening the closed areas to scalloping, leading to a merger of 
the opposing organizations into the Fishermen’s Survival Fund, which lobbied successfully for an official 
assessment of scallop stocks in the closed areas and eventual opening of scallop fishery in Closed Area II 
in 1999 controlled by fixed number of trips per vessel with trip catch limits for scallops and yellowtail 
flounder bycatch caught by scallop dredges in this area.   
 
Scallop dredges retain incidental bycatch of some finfish.  Yellowtail flounder is a frequent bycatch in the 
scallop fishery, because they occupy similar habitats as scallops.  Unlike the scallop resource, yellowtail 
flounder  stocks  on  Georges  Bank  and  in  southern  New  England  are  overfished  and  overfishing  is 
occurring.  Total catch of yellowtail flounder is limited to allow rebuilding.  The scallop fleet is allocated 
10% of the allowable catch of yellowtail flounder each year, based loosely on the catch history of the 
scallop fleet, which traditionally retained and marketed its yellowtail flounder bycatch. 
 
The high catch per unit effort (CPUE) in the closed area access fisheries and stock  assessment data 
showing increased biomass in the open areas led to a rotational area management system in 2004.
12 
Planned access rotated among closed areas, which were limited by scallop catch per vessel, and fishing in 
the open areas limited by DAS.  Vessel owners were allowed to convert closed area trips to open area 
trips at a fixed exchange rate of DAS for closed area trips.  Rotational area management successfully 
moved the scallop catch closer to optimal yield.  U.S. scallop landings averaged 24,000 metric tons (mt) IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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per year from 2000-2007 under area management compared to 9,000 mt per year from 1950-1999 under 
other forms of management.  In the most recent stock assessment scallops were classified as neither 
overfished nor was overfishing occurring according to criteria in the Act with an estimated stock size of 
1.5 times Bmsy. 
13 
 
Inefficiencies remained in the scallop fishery, however.  Bycatch limits for yellowtail flounder, which 
were almost entirely discarded during closed area trips, often closed the fishery before the maximum 
scallop catch was reached (Figure 2).  Scallop catches also fell below the closed area TAC when vessel 
owners chose open area trips over closed area trips because the DAS in the open areas yielded more net 
income than the trip limit for scallops in the closed area.   
 
Figure 2. Scallop Catch Limit and Scallop Landings in Closed Area fisheries from 2006  
through 2010. Source: NMFS 
 
Economic efficiency requires equal exploitation rates (catch/Biomass) between open areas and closed 
areas,  given  equal  trip  costs  in  the  open  and  closed  area  fisheries,  CPUE.    As  shown  in  Figure  3, 
exploitation rates were consistently lower on Georges Bank, where most of the exploitable biomass and 
catch is from the closed areas, than in the mid-Atlantic fisheries, where most of the biomass and catch is 
in  the  open  area  fisheries.    In  terms  of  the  reference  point  for  overfishing  in  the  scallop  FMP 
(instantaneous fishing mortality (F)=0.29) that was in effect in 2008
14, overfishing occurred in the mid-
Atlantic and under fishing (catch less than optimal yield) occurred on Georges Bank. 
 
Scallops left on the seafloor due to early closures suffer high natural mortality rates from high density and 
large size.  Using video surveys, Stokesbury et al showed that scallops in the Nantucket Lightship area 
increased  significantly  after  closure  in  1994,  reached  a  maximum  around  2002,  and  then  decreased 
significantly starting in 2004 almost entirely due to natural mortality (senescence, predation, and disease).  
They estimated the loss due to increases in natural mortality at US$ 100 million
15. 
 
Early closures of closed area access fisheries probably also cause more habitat damage.  Shifts of fishing 
effort  from  the  closed  to  the  open  areas  where  the  exploitation  rate  for  scallops  is  lower,  results  in 
increased time in contact between the dredge and the benthic environment. 
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There  is  some  evidence  that  vessel  owners  and  captains  attempted  informally  to  avoid  bycatch  of 
yellowtail flounder in scallop closed area fisheries.  Rago et al reported that yellowtail flounder bycatch 
as a percentage of scallop catch were low for the first few months after the CAII access fishery opened in 
1999, and “On-board observers reported that fishermen were using radio communication to identify and 
avoid  areas  of  high  yellowtail  flounder  bycatch.”
16  In  the  2006  CAII  scallop  fishery,  the  pattern  of 
cumulative scallop catch was lower at the start of the fishery than at the end of the fishery, indicating the 
possibility  of  early  avoidance  with  a  break-down  of  cooperation  as  the  fishery  progressed  towards 
closure.  (Figure 4).  In an analysis of the CAII fishery in 2006, Bachman found a significant positive 
relationship between yellowtail flounder bycatch and the proportion of trips taken.
17 
 
 
Figure 3. Exploitation Rate for Sea Scallops from 2003 to 2008. Source: NMFS & SMAST 
 
Based on these indications of bycatch avoidance in the closed area scallop fisheries, we designed and 
implemented formal programs for bycatch avoidance using fleet communication in 2009 and 2010.  For 
the CAII access fishery in 2009, we sent scallop permit holders maps showing density of scallop and 
yellowtail flounder by area within the fishing area in CAII.  In 2010, we constructed maps of scallop and 
yellowtail flounder densities for the Nantucket Lightship Area Access fishery and devised a real time 
reporting system to receive messages from captains on yellowtail flounder densities in the area they were 
fishing, analyze these data, and send messages to the scallop fleet fishing in this area identifying areas of 
high yellowtail flounder densities. 
 
2009 CAII fishery 
The 2009 CAII scallop access fishery allowed one trip per vessel limited to 18,000 pounds of scallop 
meats for each of the 348 limited access scallop vessels.  As with other CAII trips, the scallop catch was 
estimated as landings because the average discard rate for scallops for all CAII fisheries was less than 
1%
18.    The  yellowtail  flounder  catch  was  estimated  from  catch  rates  of  scallop  meats  per  pound  of 
yellowtail flounder from observed trips and scaled to the scallop catch for the fleet.  About 10% of the 
trips had observers aboard. 
 
The bycatch rate limit (pound of yellowtail flounder allowed per pound of scallops) was set higher than 
the previous CAII fishery in 2006, but the exploitable yellowtail flounder biomass in CAII had increased 
sharply.  The Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting in 2008 (GARM III) reported that the exploitable IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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Biomass for Georges Bank yellowtail flounder had increased since 2006 due to due to the strong 2005 
year-class.
19  
 
There was some evidence that GARM III had underestimated the increase in yellowtail flounder biomass 
in  CAII.    In  summer  2008,  SMAST  in  cooperation  with  11  scallop  vessels  tagged  almost  75,000 
yellowtail flounder in the portion of CAII that was scheduled to open in 2009.
20 The tag and recapture 
Peterson study estimated yellowtail flounder biomass at age 2+ yellowtail flounder in the CAII access 
area at 7,600 mt, which suggests that 1300 mt could be caught in the access area and still meet rebuilding 
objectives compared to 158 mt allowed in the 2008 CAII fishery estimated from the NMFS trawl survey. 
 
Before the fishery opened, we overlaid the flounder spatial distribution from the Peterson study with 
scallop distribution estimated from our annual video survey to produce a map showing densities of each 
species.  Two weeks before the fishery opened, we sent the map and a letter to a list of vessel owners 
asking them to avoid areas of high YT density in order to reach the scallop TAC in the CAII fishery. 
 
Figure 4. Yellowtail bycatch Cumulative Totals in 2006 (left) and 2009 CAII Scallop Fisheries. 
Source NMFS. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5, the scallop video survey and yellowtail flounder tagging study showed 
scallops as spatially distinct from yellowtail flounder in the access area in CAII, a relatively small fishing 
area, satisfying two of Abbott and Wilen’s criteria for success of voluntary bycatch avoidance: spatial 
separation between target and bycatch species within a small area that allows bycatch avoidance with low 
search costs and close proximity of fishing vessels that creates peer pressure for cooperation.  The fishery 
was also set for fixed length of time and cooperation had a high return due to the high value of the target, 
two other conditions cited by Abbott & Wilen (2010).  Allocation of only a single trip in CAII weakened 
incentives for individual gain for skippers and owners of single vessels.  
 
Initial assessment of the performance of the 2009 bycatch avoidance program is not promising.  The 
pattern of cumulative catch of yellowtail flounder in 2009 did not show the same pattern of avoidance in 
the early stages of the fishery that cumulative yellowtail flounder catch showed in 2006.  (Figure 4)  The 
2009 scallop fishery in CAII shut down three weeks after opening due to surpassing the YT TAC, leaving 
40% of the scallop TAC on the ocean floor.   
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Figure 5. Densities of Scallops and Yellowtail in CAII in 2009. Source: SMAST. 
 
2010 Nantucket Lightship Area Access (NLA) Fishery 
Despite the early closure due to the derby fishery in CAII in 2009, the 2010 NLA fishery showed promise 
for cooperative bycatch avoidance.  As with the CAII fishery in 2009, the bycatch rate limit for yellowtail 
flounder for the 2010 NLA was almost double the rate for the NLA fishery in 2008, but unlike the large 
increase in yellowtail flounder biomass in CAII, there was little evidence of a large increase in yellowtail 
flounder in the NLA.  A cooperative dredge survey conducted by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
with industry partners showed scallop and yellowtail flounder densities by area within the NLA that 
showed most areas below an average rate of yellowtail flounder bycatch below the average ratio for the 
maximum allocation for the fishery. 
 
Rumors in the port, which were later verified by the observer data, blamed the early closure of the 2009 
CAII fishery on a few large tows of yellowtail flounder in areas where we had advised.  The indication 
developed from these rumors that changes in those tows would have kept the fishery open longer, which 
led to the prevailing opinion that small improvements in avoidance could lead to large gains in scallop 
catch.  Showing increasing interest in bycatch avoidance, about 100 scallop vessels (¼ of the limited 
access scallop fleet) were represented at our first meeting (April 26, 2010) of the Fishermen’s Steering 
Committee to discuss a plan for voluntary bycatch avoidance for the NLA fishery, scheduled to open on 
June  15.    We  presented  the  results  from  the  CAII  fishery  from  2009  and  planned  improvements 
(yellowtail densities from a recent cooperative trawl survey and real-time reporting) for the coming NLA 
fishery,  including  Boatracs  authorization  sheets  for  email  messages  and  protocols  for  sending  and 
receiving messages.  The attendees responded with suggestions and discussion. 
 
More owners and captains attended our next meeting (June 3), where we presented a plan modified by 
suggestions from the previous meeting and other contacts we had made with fishermen and boat owners.  
Once  again,  we  discussed  modifications  and  tuned  the  program’s  components  and  protocols  for  the 
opening of the fishery, which was delayed until June 28.  On June 10, we sent a map showing scallop 
densities per pound of yellowtail flounder from the VIMS dredge survey (Figure 6) a letter explaining the 
program, instructions for sending and receiving bycatch information, and forms for recording bycatch by 
day for tows and bycatch in each area fished.   IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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Figure 6. Scallop/Yellowtail Densities by Area in NLA in 2010. Sources: VIMS and SMAST. 
 
Throughout this period, we publicized the program through formal and informal means.  Commercial 
Fishery News, which is widely read in the Northeast, printed an article on the front page of their June 
edition on the program and an op-ed piece that we had written on the benefits of cooperation.
21 Saving 
Seafood,  a  website  widely  followed  in  the  Northeast,  carried  news  of  the  program.    We  also  used 
organizing communication tactics: telephone, email, web site, and walking the docks to push the program.   
 
When the NLA fishery opened on June 28, 2010, owners of 90 vessels representing 120 of the 348 trips 
allowed in the access fishery had signed consent sheets.  Thirty vessels sent us weights of yellowtail 
flounder caught in areas they fished by tow during the first day of fishing.  We calculated the mean of 
yellowtail catch per tow for those areas and sent the following message to those who had signed the 
consent form and posted it on the Saving Seafood web site,  
 
“Hello Fleet.  Yellowtail Update for Tues. 6-29: 30 vessels reported 410 tows 
from 12:01am Mon 6/28 thru 8:00am Tues 6/29. 
Yellowtail catches were: 
HIGH: Q 
LOW: D,E,F,G,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,R,S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z,AA,BB,DD,EE 
NO DATA: A,B,C,I,P,CC,FF,GG,HH 
 
Cell Q had high reports from multiple boats and is a current yellowtail hotspot. 
Please continue to report data daily in the format: cell, # tows, YT lbs. 
Next report Wed 6/30. 
Thank you!!” 
 
We repeated this process every day that the fishery was open and boats were reporting their 
yellowtail flounder catch to us. IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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Conclusions: economic incentives, natural conditions, and design principles 
The  closed  area  scallop/yellowtail  flounder  fisheries  on  and  near  Georges  Bank  satisfy  most  of  the 
conditions suggested by Abbott and Wilen (2010) and Wilson (1990 and 2007) for cooperative solutions 
to reduce bycatch: high rewards for cooperation, fisheries limited in time and space, spatially distinct 
target and bycatch species, and sessile target species, whose fine-scale densities are estimated annually by 
video  survey.    These  conditions  may  not  be  sufficient  for  attaining  optimal  yield  of  each  species, 
however; high rewards can as easily work against as for cooperative behavior.   
 
Social institutions also supported voluntary bycatch avoidance.  Almost all of the limited access scallop 
vessel owners belong to the Fishery Survival Fund, a powerful trade organization that has represented 
scallopers’ interest for over 15 years.  The Fishery Survival Fund endorsed and supported the bycatch 
avoidance program n 2010.  Fishermen determined the design of the program, one of Ostrom’s design 
principles. 
22  There were clear boundary rules; participants knew with whom to cooperate, the first of 
Ostrom’s design principles.  The area fished was small enough so that fishermen could see who was 
fishing in areas of high yellowtail flounder density, a form of self-monitoring facilitated by peer-pressure, 
another of Ostrom’s design principles. 
 
It is far too early to estimate the performance of the voluntary bycatch avoidance programs: a process that 
involves selecting objectives and metrics to represent those objectives, collecting data, and analyzing 
those data based on the chosen metrics.  Preliminary reports seem promising.  About 1/3 of the fleet 
joined the process with over 60 vessels reporting yellowtail catch and number of tows by area per day.  
Their yellowtail bycatch was below the average of scallops per yellowtail that would close the fishery.  
There is some evidence that scallopers moved off the areas that we analyzed as low scallop per yellowtail 
densities and fished in areas with high scallop per yellowtail densities.  If these trends continue, the 
scallop allocation will be caught for the first time in a closed area fishery. 
 
In the immediate future, we plan to report results to the Fishermen’s Steering Committee and to the 
Fishermen’s Survival Fund.  Management plans haven’t been completed for 2012, but scallop access to 
closed areas on George’s Bank seems likely.  We have begun to plan for another voluntary bycatch 
avoidance program in 2011 adjusting for errors (many technology problems) and knowledge gained in the 
2010 NLA fishery (mainly communication failures).  We plan to include voluntary gear modifications to 
exclude yellowtail flounder in the future. Several modifications have shown promise.  Several vessel 
owners and captains told us that they were trying some modifications to reduce bycatch this year. 
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